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PROTECTING THE CITIZEN "WHILST HE
IS QUIET": SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES,




Certain government searches are likely to get anyone's
Fourth Amendment adrenalin pumping: political leaders using
government agents to ferret out dissidents and silence their
criticisms; the police battering down an innocent citizen's door
based upon only the flimsiest of tips; officers indiscriminately
rounding up citizens for questioning merely because their race
matches a victim's vague description; the soccer mom dragged
off in handcuffs by an overzealous cop for an offense that at
most could result in a fine.' These are classic government-
citizen encounters that raise our Fourth Amendment ire be-
cause they touch a deep republican chord in the American
conscience and harken back to the colonists' struggles against
oppression and overreaching government officials. Moreover,
these moments are easily visualized as if they were an episode
of COPS. We can feel a rush of angry indignation if we imag-
ine ourselves being pushed into the back of a police cruiser as
our toddlers look on, or we can sense the dread of those who
have opposed tyrants over the centuries and heard the heavy
footsteps down the hallway foretelling of the "midnight knock"
of government agents.
. Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.
The author would like to thank Professors Joshua Dressler, Chris Slobogin and
George Thomas for their helpful comments, and the National Center for Justice
and the Rule of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law, for the invitation
to participate in the symposium. The Frances Lewis Law Center provided
invaluable research support by providing for the help of Kwan Min (Washington
& Lee '06) as my research assistant.
Although many find this last example alarming, the Supreme Court found
it constitutional in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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What are often labeled "regulatory" or "administrative" or
"special needs" searches, on the other hand, are far less likely
to rally the citizenry to the Fourth Amendment barricades.
These searches would be more the material of a show called
CLERKS rather than COPS, as the citizen hands over a urine
sample to the employee of a drug testing firm or opens the
door to a thickly bespectacled housing inspector wanting to
check for faulty wiring. Moreover, such searches often are
instituted in the name of a powerful public good, such as re-
gaining control of our nation's schools from the grip of drugs
or protecting innocent babies from being born addicted to
crack.
Compared to administrative searches, "checkpoints" that
require an individual to submit to someone in a police uniform
are more likely to excite Fourth Amendment sensibilities, but
they still are unlikely to cause much public uproar. They tend
to be brief encounters that, at least in theory, apply to every-
one, sparing the individual the indignation of being singled
out by the police as a wrongdoer. And like administrative
searches, the image of a checkpoint tends to not have much
imaginative or visual punch as the line of cars wends its way
through a sobriety or immigration roadblock. By contrast, the
public good that the checkpoint is trying to accom-
plish-removing drunken drivers from the roads or catching
drug pushers-immediately resonates as desirable.
For those who believe that administrative searches and
checkpoints are constitutionally worrisome, therefore, the
difficulty is to explain why, even if these types of searches
might not make good reality television, something important
is at stake. The Court's explanation traditionally has been
primarily rooted in the idea of privacy. In Camara v. Munici-
pal Court of San Francisco,2 when the Court first brought
administrative searches within the Fourth Amendment fold by
holding that housing inspections were subject to the
Amendment, the majority explained that while a housing
inspection might not be a "hostile intrusion," the individual
still "has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances
2 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by offi-
cial authority. .... ,'
Given the context of Camara, the Court's use of privacy as
the core rationale for assessing administrative searches made
sense. Because the Court had previously found that housing
inspections were only at the peripherary of the Amendment,4
the Camara Court needed a means of bringing the inspections
more fully within the Amendment's protections. The idea of
protecting the "sanctity of the home" provided such a means
because the inspections required entering an individual's
house even if the inspector was only looking for faulty wir-
ing.5 Moreover, the Court that same term in Katz v. United
States6 was in the process of making "reasonable expectations
of privacy" the centerpiece of the Amendment's protections.7
Consequently, the now familiar Camara formula of "flexible
probable cause" as requiring the weighing of the government's
need for the intrusion against the severity of the intrusion on
the individual's privacy interest made logical sense.' Privacy
soon became the Fourth Amendment gold standard in discuss-
ing the constitutionality of inspections, regulatory searches
and checkpoints.
But while privacy might have provided a substantial
counterweight in the context of an intrusion inside the home,
it proved to be much more of a makeweight when the Court
addressed inspections and regulatory searches in other set-
tings. A brief stop at a checkpoint might impinge upon one's
privacy, but the impingement simply is not of the magnitude
of an agent of the government entering one's home, even if the
agent is only a housing inspector wearing a pocket protector
Camara, 387 U.S. at 530-31.
See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 531 (noting also that housing inspections were en-
forced by criminal processes).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37. This is not to say that the Camara formula-
tion properly calibrated the scales when it came to determining how the
government's interest should be weighed against the individual's privacy interest.
See generally Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing
The Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988).
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and armed with a clipboard. A dialogue centered on privacy
might seem more relevant when the "search" involves urine
samples because of the great privacy we want when we per-
form our bodily functions, but the usefulness of privacy for
defining the Fourth Amendment stakes becomes far less help-
ful if the sample is given without observation. As the Court's
cases involving random urine testing illustrate, the privacy
imagery then becomes more of providing a urine sample at the
doctor's office to check on one's health than of the police enter-
ing one's front door.9
If regulatory searches and checkpoints are thought of
primarily in terms of physical privacy, therefore, they often
appear as essentially de minimis constitutional violations,
especially when conducted outside of the home. One might
attempt to overcome this de minimis appearance by using an
analogy to the Court's reasoning in Wickard v. Filburn°
where it was held that a single farmer's use of wheat affected
interstate commerce.1 An argument could be made, for ex-
ample, that just like the effect of the consumption of wheat by
a single farmer from his field must be thought of as multiplied
by thousands of farmers harvesting wheat from their fields,
the privacy interest at stake with one sample of urine must
also be thought of in the aggregate of thousands being forced
to give urine samples. But not only is the image of multiplying
urine samples somewhat disconcerting, it does not really do
much to raise the public's Fourth Amendment dander.
Yet clearly some Fourth Amendment instinct is at play in
these cases. Not only have cases involving checkpoints and
drug testing commanded the Supreme Court's attention, they
often have provoked strongly worded opinions. Justice Scalia,
for example, direly warned when the Court upheld
suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service employees that
"[tihose who lose because of the lack of understanding that
See generally Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
10 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
" Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (holding that while a single farmer's use of
wheat may be insignificant, if "taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, [it] is far from trivial").
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begot the present exercise in symbolism are not just the Cus-
toms Service employees, whose dignity is thus offended, but
all of us-who suffer a coarsening of our national manners
that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its con-
tent .... 12
But if the language of privacy does not adequately capture
the values that are in jeopardy through suspicionless searches
and checkpoints, how might we better frame the issues to
address what is at stake? Various alternative ways of thinking
about the Fourth Amendment have been proposed. For exam-
ple, it is argued that we ought to recast our analysis to ac-
count for the role of trust between the citizen and
government,13 to focus on the importance of individual re-
spect,14 or to see police coercion as the primary problem un-
der the Fourth Amendment in today's world. 5 While these
differing formulations offer fruitful insights, the Supreme
Court itself, in two fairly recent opinions, may have offered
the analytical stepping stone to how these types of searches
might best be looked at under the Fourth Amendment. With-
out specifically mentioning general warrants, the Court's deci-
sions in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond6 and Ferguson v.
City of Charleston7 raise themes that directly cast back to
the concern over general warrants that served as the impetus
for the Fourth Amendment. It may be that this historical
concern provides the key to dealing with modern phenomena
like government drug testing and an expanding law enforce-
ment presence with the capability of conducting widespread
searches and checkpoints.
2 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
a See generally Sundby, supra note 9.
See generally Andrew Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (2003).
" See generally William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995).
18 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
17 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR A REVIVAL OF THE
GENERAL WARRANTS DOCTRINE
The general warrant and the excessive amount of discre-
tion that it placed in the hands of the government agents
conducting the search stands as the primary evil at which the
Fourth Amendment was directed." The Fourth Amendment's
concerns with general warrants echo directly back to two fa-
mous English cases that addressed the legality of general
warrants during the time when the United States was still a
British colony. In the Wilkes case, the British Secretary of
State, Lord Halifax, issued a warrant authorizing four mes-
sengers to search for the printers and publishers of the "sedi-
tious" publication The North Briton, No. 45.19 Apart from
lacking statutory authority, the warrant did not specify the
places to be searched or identify the persons to be seized.2"
By the end of the search, more than twenty-four people had
been arrested,2 some with no connection to The North Brit-
on, and "quantities" of private papers had been seized.22 The
English court found the warrant to be "hopelessly defective,"
with no "offenders' names" specified, no inventory of things
taken away, and a broad discretion given to the messengers
that was "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject."2"
Afterwards, the Entick case was decided, in which Lord
See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amend-
ment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999).
"' Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.D. 1763).
20 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498.
2 In addition to Wilkes, who was the publisher of The North Briton, various
other printers who had been arrested and later released when it appeared they
had not printed Number 45 also sued, with juries returning "heavy verdicts" for
the plaintiffs. TELFORD TAYLOR, Search, Seizure, and Surveillance, in Two STUD-
IES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19, 30-31 (1969).
22 Id. at 30.
'3 Id. at 31. After the jury returned a verdict for £1,000, the messengers took
exception to the verdicts, which brought the cases before Lord Mansfiled, who af-
firmed the judgment on the narrow ground that the principle plaintiff, Dryden
Leach, was in fact not the printer of the targeted publication, and therefore the
warrant could not justify the trespass. Id. at 31-32. But in the course of argu-
ments, Mansfield gave the opinion that the Halifax warrant was too "general" be-
cause no person was named or described in it. Id. at 32.
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Halifax had issued a warrant "for arrest of the person and
seizure of the books and papers of John Entick," who also was
suspected of seditious writings.24 Entick was arrested and his
papers seized; after his release he sued the messengers in
trespass, and the jury returned a verdict of £300.5 On ap-
peal, Lord Camden ruled in favor of Entick because the mes-
sengers failed to obey the directions of the warrant and be-
cause the statutory authority to search for libelous papers had
expired.26 In addition, Camden noted that the warrant in
question was deficient because it "did not authorize merely the
seizure of Entick's libellous papers, but all of them, libellous
or not. Furthermore, the warrant had other flaws: no oath of
probable cause had been given, and no record was made of
what had been seized."27
Within the colonies, the Wilkes and Entick cases received
attention both through English and colonial newspaper ac-
counts and pamphlets that were written about the cases and
circulated." The colonies also were focused on general war-
rants because they faced their own form of general warrants
through the writs of assistance that authorized customs offi-
cials to search for untaxed imported goods. The writs became
the focus of James Otis' famous argument against the legality
of writs of assistance in 1761.29 Although Otis's argument
failed and the issue of writs was reauthorized by the
Townshend Act of 1767, the reauthorization itself sparked
widespread discontent and gave rise to a number of legal
challenges to the writs, with colonial judges often refusing to
issue the writs as contrary to law.3°
The concern with general warrants and writs of assistance
24 Id.
2' Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807-08 (C.B. 1765).
26 TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 33. The directions called for the messengers to
be accompanied by a constable and to bring Entick before Halifax himself, but
the messengers failed to bring a constable with them and brought Entick before
Halifax's assistant. Id.
2 Id. at 33-34.
2' Davies, supra note 18, at 563-65.
29 For an excerpt of this argument, see infra note 183 and accompanying text.
30 Davies, supra note 18, at 561-67. Otis's argument is discussed in more
detail at infra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
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thus forms a rich historical backdrop to the Fourth
Amendment's development and has continued to play an im-
portant role in shaping the ongoing debate over whether the
"reasonableness" or the "warrant" clause should have primacy
in interpreting how the Fourth Amendment should be applied.
Those advocating that a general reasonableness standard
should prevail have used the historical dislike of general war-
rants as one way of arguing that the Framers would have
preferred warrantless searches over an approach that favors
warrants. Supporters of the warrant-preference view, on the
other hand, have drawn upon the abuses underlying the use of
the general warrant--"searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate"--to
justify requiring the judicial issuance of warrants as the
Fourth Amendment norm.3 Although the Court recently has
given increasing credence to the reasonableness approach,32
the Court through most of the twentieth-century has used a
warrant-preference approach and has relied upon the idea
that the Framers preferred specific warrants because it cur-
tailed the discretion of law enforcement agents to act without
judicial approval: "[Slearches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions."33
But while the Framers' concern over general warrants has
played and continues to play an important role in how we
interpret the Fourth Amendment, as a day-to-day matter the
colonial concern over general warrants has largely faded into
the background. True, the Court occasionally will use the
problem of general warrants to elucidate a particular aspect of
the Fourth Amendment, such as what constitutes a "neutral
or detached magistrate" or what is a sufficiently particularized
search warrant. In Lo-Ji Sales v New York,34 for instance, the
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
32 See generally Sundby, supra note 9, at 1765-71.
31 Katz; 389 U.S. at 357.
442 U.S. 319 (1999).
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Court held a search that uncovered pornographic materials
was unconstitutional because the town justice who issued the
search warrant had stepped outside of his role as a "neutral
and detached" judicial officer.3" The Court justified its ruling
by recognizing that the neutrality of the magistrate is critical
to avoid moving towards general warrants, observing that
"[o]ur society is better able to tolerate the admittedly porno-
graphic business of petitioner than a return to the general
warrant era .... 3 In similar fashion, the Court made refer-
ence to the "hated" writs of assistance in Stanford v. Texas"
when explaining its decision that a search warrant had not
been sufficiently particularized because it was issued broadly
"for the purpose of searching for and seizing any books, re-
cords, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings, or any written instruments showing that a person
or organization is violating or has violated any provision of" a
statute specifically targeting the Communist Party of Tex-
as.
38
As a practical matter, though, and despite the rhetorical
homage that the Court has paid to the role that the struggle
against general warrants played in the formation of the
Fourth Amendment, relatively few cases actually have run
afoul of the prohibition against general warrants. The concern
over general warrants for most of the twentieth century,
therefore, has been to supply a theoretical and historical un-
derpinning for the Supreme Court's warrant-preference ap-
proach; as a specific tool for enforcing the Fourth Amendment,
however, its scope has been fairly limited. This was not be-
cause the aversion to general warrants had lessened, but sim-
ply because by making the warrant clause the first step in
Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court had largely pre-
empted the possibility of general warrants in the historical
3' Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 326.
36 Id. at 329.
379 U.S. 476 (1965).
Stanford, 379 U.S. at 477. The state was not helped by the fact that in
executing the warrant, the agents rounded up books "by such diverse writers as
Karl Marx, Jean Paul Sartre, Theodore Draper, Fidel Castro, Earl Browder, Pope
John XXIII, and MR. JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK." Id. at 479-80.
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sense. That is, because the prevailing norm was now that a
government search required a judicially issued warrant partic-
ularized in its description, executive or legislatively authorized
searches without judicial oversight were the exception rather
than the rule. Consequently, the aversion to the abuses of
general warrants had become more of an inspirational back-
ground value than a day-to-day tool for enforcing the Fourth
Amendment.
Developments over the past several decades, however,
may slowly have moved Fourth Amendment analysis to the
point where the general warrants doctrine may soon be taken
out of the "holy constitutional relics" category and given a far
more active role in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Sev-
eral factors in particular have set the stage for a possible
renaissance of the general warrants doctrine.
The first is the rise of technology that enabled the govern-
ment to undertake widespread surveillance in a manner that
simply was not possible before. Prior to the development of
such technology, individualized suspicion not only made good
Fourth Amendment sense, it also made good economic sense
in that finite law enforcement resources were best allocated in
pursuit of those about whom suspicion already existed. The
1980's, however, saw the advent of extensive drug testing in
the workplace that soon spread over into the government
sphere. The ability to quickly determine whether a group of
individuals was taking drugs through a simple test allowed
the government to learn information that before would have
taken around-the-clock surveillance by a legion of law enforce-
ment spies. Now that the government could gain the same
information through laboratory testing of easily obtained sam-
ples, the capacity to engage in blanket testing rather than
ferreting out offenders on an individual basis became far more
feasible and tempting.
But while improved economic and technological feasibility
made it possible to engage in these types of suspicionless
intrusions, the government could not, of course, use these
methods unless the Fourth Amendment was interpreted as
allowing them. And, it has been the Court's gradual move
towards a view that embraces the Reasonableness Clause as
[VOL. 74
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the primary fulcrum for Fourth Amendment analysis that has
made this allowance possible.
Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to
charting the Court's movement away from a warrant-prefer-
ence model of the Fourth Amendment toward a conceptual-
ization of the Fourth Amendment universe that has the Rea-
sonableness Clause at its center. In particular, the movement
gained momentum once the Court announced that if the gov-
ernment could show "special needs" other than crime detec-
tion, then suspicionless searches would be permissible if the
government's justification outweighed the intrusion on the
privacy interest. At a dizzying pace for the world of
constitutional law, the Court in a six-year period between
1989 and 1995 used a reasonableness-based analysis to ap-
prove of suspicionless searches in a variety of settings, rang-
ing from sobriety checkpoints to the drug testing of student-
athletes.39 It soon became a familiar Fourth Amendment
sight to see courts finding "special needs" based upon safety or
the nature of one's employment, pulling out the reasonable-
ness balancing scales, and then placing the government's
interest on one side and the individual's privacy interest on
the other side.
Not surprisingly, the Court's growing receptivity to the
idea that a search or seizure can be "reasonable" outside the
traditional requirements of the Warrant Clause has had im-
portant ramifications. For our purposes of thinking about a re-
birth of concern over general warrants, two side-effects are
particularly significant.
First, because the generalized-reasonableness approach
does not view probable cause as an essential prerequisite, the
role of individualized suspicion lost some of its Fourth Amend-
ment swagger. This effect is important because one of the vir-
tues of requiring individualized suspicion is that it gives the
citizen the power to control the government's ability to in-
"' See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Mich. Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executive Ass'n, 489




trude. If a person does not act in a manner giving rise to prob-
able cause (or reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop), the gov-
ernment has no discretion under the Fourth Amendment to
engage in a search or seizure. Once suspicionless searches are
recognized as a permissible subset of Fourth Amendment
searches, however, the citizen can be subjected to intrusions
simply for undertaking innocent activities such as wanting to
play the trumpet in the school marching band40 or applying
for a government job.4 1 The government's discretion, in other
words, no longer is limited by the citizen's actions but can now
extend to conducting intrusions so long as the government can
show that its desire to intrude is "reasonable," a situation
which begins to touch upon one of the underlying core con-
cerns with general warrants-expansive government discre-
tion in conducting searches.
The second side-effect was to alter the nature of the
Court's decision-making role under the Fourth Amendment.
Under the classic warrant-preference model, the role of the
judiciary is primarily one of a fact finder. A magistrate who is
requested to issue a warrant will engage in an inquiry that is
tied to the central question of whether sufficient facts exist to
constitute probable cause. Even in the review of the constitu-
tionality of a warrantless search that has already taken place,
a court will focus on questions of historical fact (for example,
whether exigent circumstances existed that excused obtaining
a warrant). In these contexts, the judiciary is overseeing exec-
utive- and legislative-authorized intrusions through fact-find-
ing that is then measured against Fourth Amendment
benchmarks such as probable cause and exigency. A court, in
other words, is not being asked to independently determine as
a policy matter whether a search is "reasonable" (for example,
whether the search of the individual's house was a sound
policy decision); rather, the judiciary is determining the
search's legitimacy by finding the historical facts that preced-
ed the intrusion (for example, whether probable cause of drugs
in the house existed that allowed the judge to issue the war-
40 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
" See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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rant to search the individual's house).
By contrast, once courts are asked to start assessing the
"reasonableness" of intrusions like sobriety checkpoints or
drug tests, the judiciary is placed in the position of having to
engage in a policy inquiry fashioned as a balancing test of the
government's need for the program against the level of intru-
sion on the citizen. This new role is particularly important
because it no longer centers around historical facts, but re-
quires the Court to decide how much independence it should
exercise in assessing whether an executive or legislative
search is reasonable. And in its early cases using the
reasonablenss balancing test, the Court adopted what ap-
peared to be a fairly deferential approach.42 In his opinion for
the Court upholding sobriety checkpoints, for example, Justice
Rehnquist expressly stated that "for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, the choice among ... reasonable alter-
natives remains with the governmental officials who have a
unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited
public resources . . .. "
This deferential approach was particularly evident in the
early "special needs" case of Von Raab. In justifying
suspicionless drug testing of Customs Service employees, the
Court was presented a record with scant evidence of drug use
by the employees who were to be tested." While the govern-
ment suggested that Customs Services agents using drugs
might be susceptible to blackmail or could be dangerous if
carrying guns, it was unable to present evidence that such
problems were occurring.45 The majority finessed the problem
by starting with the assumption that "the traditional-probable
cause standard may be unhelpful in analyzing the reasonable-
ness of routine administrative functions, especially where the
42 A major complaint of the dissents in the "special needs" cases was that the
majority was deferring to the government's assessment of the program's need and
efficacy. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 652 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's "blind acceptance of the Government's assertion [that the program
would deter substance abuse by workers]").
41 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54.
" Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 673.
46 Id. at 674.
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Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous
conditions or to detect violations that rarely generate
articulable grounds for searching any particular place or per-
son." 6 This assumption allowed the majority to gloss over the
absence of any showing that the Customs Service was actually
facing a problem with drug use and to instead give the govern-
ment the power to infer a potential problem based merely on
the fact that a drug problem exists in society generally: "It is
sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest in
preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from
spreading to the particular context."' 7
Justice Scalia in his dissent highlighted the lack of any
evidence, pointing out that "[tihe Court's opinion... will be
searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that will
be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees."48
Justice Scalia found the lack of a supporting record particular-
ly disturbing because it led him to conclude that the
government's real purpose was merely a symbolic one of prov-
ing that the Service was "clean," a purpose that Scalia thought
it "obvious ... is unacceptable."49 Justice Scalia's objection,
therefore, was that the Court was not vigorously testing the
government's justifications, but was allowing the government
to rely upon generalizations rather than demonstrating that a
problem existed.0 He concluded that "if such a generalization
suffices... the Fourth Amendment has become a frail protec-
" Id. at 668 (citations omitted).
'7 Id. at 675 n.3.
48 Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe for a minute that the
driving force behind these drug-testing rules was any of the feeble justifications
put forward by counsel here and accepted by the Court."). Justice Scalia's belief
that a purely symbolic purpose would not support a Fourth Amendment "special
needs" finding appears to have been vindicated in the later case of Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1995) (holding requirement of drug testing of candi-
dates for state office invalid); see infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
5 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 685-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Executive Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 653 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("The majority's credulous acceptance of the [Federal Railway Administration]'s
deterrence rationale is made all the more suspect by the agency's failure to intro-
duce, in an otherwise ample administrative record, any studies explaining or




One effect of the Court's movement to a reasonableness
test when coupled with a deferential approach, therefore, was
to grant the legislature and executive branches greater discre-
tion under the Fourth Amendment. The Court did not com-
pletely abdicate the Fourth Amendment's concern with con-
trolling discretion in these early "special need" cases, but tend-
ed to focus on guarding against "standardless and uncon-
strained discretion" being granted to the officer in the field
rather than on scrutinizing the policy judgment of the need for
the search in the first place. 2 As a result, the general
warrant's potential vice of the searches being conducted with-
out meaningful judicial oversight appeared to be gaining a
foothold. While still a far cry from government officials ran-
sacking homes on a random basis, the specter of government
intrusions without individualized suspicion based upon a bu-
reaucrat or government official's determination that a "special
need" for such an intrusion existed began to take shape.
III. CHANDLER, EDMOND AND FERGUSON: THE EMERGING
ROLE OF THE COURT AS "POLICY MAGISTRATE"
The Court's sensitivity to the possibility that the "special
needs" category of cases might quickly expand and swallow up
the Amendment surfaced in Chandler v. Miller.3 In Chan-
dler, the Georgia state legislature had passed a statute requir-
ing that before a candidate could be placed on the ballot the
candidate must within thirty days of qualifying for the elec-
tion or nomination present a certificate from a state-approved
laboratory stating that the candidate had submitted to a uri-
nalysis drug test and tested negative.54 The statute applied
to state offices ranging from the position of Governor to the
", Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia recognized
that in certain contexts, such as a nuclear power plant, a potential disaster might
justify the inability to demonstrate a problem at the moment. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
5 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (quoting Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).
5' 520 U.S. 305 (1995).
" Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
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Commissioner of Agriculture." All judicial candidates also
were subject to the drug testing requirement." The Libertari-
an Party nominees for state offices challenged the state stat-
ute in federal court as violating the Fourth Amendment. 7
The lower federal courts had upheld the drug testing
requirement despite a lack of evidence that Georgia's elected
officials were involved with drug abuse.58 In particular, the
lower courts relied upon the Supreme Court's approval in Van
Raab of drug testing based on the mere potential for black-
mail if a Customs employee in a sensitive position should
develop a drug problem, rather than because of any evidence
of an actual drug problem in the Customs Service.59 Not un-
reasonably, the Eleventh Circuit majority had found similar
considerations applied to individuals holding state elected
offices and understood the Supreme Court's prior cases as not
applying a particularly strict concept of what constituted a
"special need" so long as it served interests other than the
ordinary needs of law enforcement.60
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in an 8-1 deci-
sion, however, attempted to cabin the earlier decisions uphold-
ing suspicionless searches as belonging to a "closely guarded
category" of cases "involving limited circumstances." 1 In
making her characterization of these prior cases, Justice
Ginsburg stressed those parts of their holdings that made
mention of qualities such as "surpassing safety interests,"62
"grave safety threats,"63 "high risk positions,"64 and "imme-
diate crisis." 5 Judged against these types of government
needs and with the State of Georgia conceding during oral
argument that no evidence existed of drug abuse by public
' Id. at 309-10.
" Id. at 310.
57 Id.
61 Id. at 311.
59 Id.
60 Id.
6' Id. at 308-09.
62 Id. at 315 (describing Skinner and drug testing of railroad workers).
Id. at 316 (describing Von Raab and testing of Customs Service employees).
Id.
Id. (describing Vernonia and testing of student athletes).
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office holders," the majority opinion was able to conclude
that "notably lacking... is any indication of a concrete dan-
ger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main
rule [of individualized suspicion]. " " Justice Ginsburg also
noted that the statute was not "well designed" to effectuate its
purpose of catching drug users running for public office be-
cause of the ease of scheduling the test to avoid testing posi-
tive (the candidate knew the date that he or she would be
tested); the state, therefore, "ha[d] offered no reason why ordi-
nary law enforcement methods would not suffice ... .. 8
The Chandler Court thus made a strenuous effort to char-
acterize its prior "special needs" cases as the exception rather
than the rule. The Court especially went out of its way to try
and limit the effects of Von Raab's approval of drug testing
despite the absence of any evidence of drug abuse, a void
which Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab had made a central
feature of his argument that the Court was approving drug
testing as a mere symbolic gesture.69 The Chandler majority
argued that Von Raab was "[hiardly a decision opening broad
vistas for suspicionless searches [and] must be read in its
unique context [of employees involved in drug interdiction and
not subject to day-to-day scruntiny."70 Consequently, the ma-
jority concluded, the lack of evidence of drug abuse by public
officials relegated Georgia's justification for drug testing mere-
ly to one of "the image [that] the State seeks to project,"
meaning that "the need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not
'special'" and, therefore, must fail.7
Chandler's rhetoric presented a very strong statement
limiting suspicionless searches, with the Court engaging in
some tough constitutional talk warning that its prior cases
" During oral argument the state's attorney remarked, "[T]here is no such
evidence land] to be frank, there is no such problem as we sit here today." Id. at
319.
67 Id.
" Id. at 320.
69 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
70 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
" Id. at 321-22.
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should not be misunderstood.72 Individualized suspicion was
still the norm and, the Court admonished, any departure had
better be justified by a "special" need and not merely a "sym-
bolic" one.73 The Chandler decision also ended what had
started to become a steady march of victories by the govern-
ment in defending programs of suspicionless searches. The
Court, therefore, appeared to be retaking some of the Fourth
Amendment ground that it arguably had conceded to the legis-
lative and executive branches in cases like Von Raab.
At the time Chandler was decided, though, it was difficult
to ascertain how seriously to take the Court's flexing of its
Fourth Amendment muscle when it came to suspicionless
searches. The Court in other areas of criminal procedure has
sometimes used relatively easy cases to make an emphatic
point about the constitutional issue at stake, but then has
failed to provide meaningful follow-through in more difficult
cases.74 And Chandler was an easy case in many ways. The
state of Georgia candidly admitted at oral argument that it
had made no effort to develop a record supporting the need for
drug testing elected officials and that little likelihood existed
of actually screening out a marijuana-smoking or cocaine-
snorting individual anxious to become Commissioner of Agri-
culture or Governor. Indeed, at points the oral argument
slipped into jocularity, with Mr. Chandler at one point sug-
gesting to laughter in the courtroom that one might be able to
"argue that drug users would [not] be any worse than [what]
the General Assembly Georgia has now," adding that "there's
an old saying down in Georgia that no man's liberty or proper-
ty is safe as long as [the Legislature is] in session."75 In
short, unlike in Von Raab, the state made no effort to act as if
the drug testing statute was anything other than a symbolic
gesture, allowing the Court to strike down a purely symbolic
use of suspicionless drug testing without having to proceed
72 Id. at 315-21.
" Id. at 322.
74 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages:
The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 (2002).
Oral argument at 54-55, Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (No. 96-
126) (argued Jan. 14, 1997).
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beyond the state's proffered justification or having to scruti-
nize the state's arguments about efficacy.
What might happen in a more difficult case still remained
to be seen. Justice Ginsburg had written strong words about
the "closely guarded" class of suspicionless searches, but other
cases like Skinner, Von Raab and Vernonia all contained rea-
soning that lent themselves to a less restrictive reading calling
for a more deferential stance towards the legislative and exec-
utive branches' judgment that a suspicionless search was
necessary. This was the reading that the Eleventh Circuit
majority had adopted below76  and that Chief Justice
Rehnquist put forward as the lone dissenter in Chandler.77
The Chief Justice argued that the notion of a "special need"
had been "used in Skinner and Von Raab . . . in a quite dif-
ferent way than it is used by the Court today,""8 and empha-
sized that the Court's touchstone for assessing a search under
the Fourth Amendment was that it need only be "reason-
able."79 The Chief Justice maintained, therefore, that "[u1nder
our precedents, if there was a proper governmental purpose
other than law enforcement, there was a 'special need' and
the Court should defer to the legislative policy judgment so
long as it was "reasonable."" Using this far more deferential
viewpoint, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Georgia's lack
of any factual finding of pot smoking in the Governor's man-
sion was not troubling under the Fourth Amendment because
the legislature is free to enact prophylactic measures to pre-
vent the problem from ever arising.8 This was true, he main-
tained, even if the measures might strike some as over the
top: "[niothing in the Fourth Amendment or in any other part
of the Constitution prevents a State from enacting a statute
whose principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even
silly to the Members of this Court."8'
7' Chandler, 520 U.S. at 311-12.
Id. at 325-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7s Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 325, 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
s2 Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Perhaps sensing, though, that Chandler's facts provided
an easy target for the Court to declare the importance of indi-
vidualized suspicion without facing much constitutional fall-
out, the Chief Justice's dissent sounded almost sanguine de-
spite his disagreement with the majority's result. In ending
his dissent, the Chief Justice seemed to suggest that the
majority's strong stance was a bluff, stating, "Lest readers
expect the holding of this case to be extended to any other
case, the Court notes that the drug test here is not a part of a
medical examination designed to provide certification of a
candidate's general health."83 His dissent appeared to predict,
therefore, that if the state in the future more carefully crafted
its "special need"-for example, presenting drug testing as
part of a required health examination for a candidate-that
the Court would move back to a more deferential stance.'
From this perspective, then, the Chandler case could be seen
as a Fourth Amendment outlier where, despite the Court's
broad pronouncements, all it really was holding was that
suspicionless searches for an admittedly symbolic purpose
would not pass constitutional muster.
But if Chandler presented itself at the fringes of what
constituted a "special need," the subsequent cases of Edmond
and Ferguson fit far more comfortably within the mainstream
of the Court's prior special need cases: Edmond's utilization of
narcotic checkpoints" seemed a close cousin to the sobriety
checkpoints approved in Sitz,s6 and Ferguson's drug testing of
pregnant mothers to help prevent the birth of crack-addicted
babies8" appeared a classic "special need." Yet the Court
struck down both programs88 and in the process provided in-
teresting insights and raised interesting questions about the
future of suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment.
83 Id. at 327 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
's City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000).
a6 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
67 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 n.1 (2001).
88 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48.
[VOL. 74
PROTECTING THE CITIZEN
A. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
As a physical intrusion, the narcotics checkpoint in
Edmond was well within the norm of prior checkpoints and
far more impressive when judged by efficacy.89 The Indianap-
olis Police Department had conducted six checkpoints between
August and November 1998 that alerted drivers as they ap-
proached that a narcotics checkpoint was located a certain
distance ahead at which a "naroctics K-9" would be in use.9"
The checkpoints' design reflected earlier Supreme Court warn-
ings on the need to control field officer discretion, with written
directives specifying how the officers stationed at each
checkpoint should conduct the stops.91 The instructions de-
tailed that a certain number of cars were to be stopped in a
particular sequence and that each stop was to be limited to
under five minutes during which the officer would ask for a
license and registration while a narcotics-detecting dog walked
around the stopped vehicle.2 To highlight the checkpoint's
relative physical non-intrusiveness, Judge Easterbrook de-
scribed the checkpoints in his Seventh Circuit dissenting opin-
ion as "a five-minute wait with man's best friend outside."93
The six checkpoints that had been conducted stopped 1161
cars and resulted in the arrest of 104 motorists for an arrest
rate of 9.4% (approximately half of the arrests were for drug-
related offenses and half were for other offenses).94 The near-
ly one out of ten arrest rate was far more efficient compared
to the approximately one out of one thousand success rate for
immigration checkpoints or one out of a hundred for sobriety
checkpoints, a contrast that led Judge Easterbrook to deem
the narcotics checkpoint as "spectacularly successful" by com-
parison to earlier checkpoints approved by the Supreme
Court." Therefore, judged by the criteria of physical intru-
" See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-36.
90 Id.
'z Id. at 35-36.
92 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999).
Edmond, 183 F. 3d at 671 (Easterbook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 661.
g5 Id. at 666 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The actual success rate was .12%
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siveness, limits on the discretion of the field officers, and effi-
ciency, the Indianapolis Police Department had appeared to do
everything by the Fourth Amendment book based upon prior
Supreme Court rulings.
Yet, the Supreme Court struck down the checkpoints by a
six to three margin96 and, in fact, the tally of Justices disap-
proving of the checkpoints was even higher.97 Although Jus-
tice Thomas was one of the three dissenters, he dissented only
because he believed that the checkpoints were valid based
upon Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte's holdings.98 But after express-
ing this view, Justice Thomas invited reconsideration of Sitz
and Martinez-Fuerte as he expressed his "doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered
'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals
not suspected of wrongdoing."99 Seven Justices thus thought
the narcotics checkpoint ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment
either because the program did not satisfy Sitz or because Sitz
itself was flawed.
To someone who had not followed the rise of the reason-
ableness test and the Court's approval of suspicionless search-
es and seizures in the first cases it heard, Edmond perhaps
would not seem particularly remarkable. In many ways, Jus-
tice O'Connor's Edmond opinion reads like a cut-and-paste
application of the Fourth Amendment principles that Justice
Ginsburg laid out in Chandler. The Edmond analysis began
with the proposition that "ordinarily" individualized suspicion
can be dispensed with only in "limited circumstances" where a
"program was designed to serve 'special needs' beyond the
normal need for law enforcement.""° Justice O'Connor then
proceeded to note that, "[wie have never approved a check-
point program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence
for the immigration checkpoints in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) and 1.6% for the sobriety checkponts at issue in Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
96 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 33.
'7 See id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'9 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 37.
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of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,""0 ' an observation that was
to take on a mantra-like quality as the opinion repeated the
essence of this statement six more times before the opinion
ended.10
What makes Edmond worth noticing, and arguably marks
a new phase of Fourth Amendment decision making, was the
majority's willingness to step into the record and scrutinize
the state's justification. °3 Recall that in Chandler judicial
examination of the legislative justification was unnecessary
because the state made little effort to adorn their reasons for
engaging in drug testing as anything other than a symbolic
gesture. 104 In Edmond, on the other hand, the City of India-
napolis argued that it was within the realm of "special needs"
cases even if part of its purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing."5 As the City pointed out,
previous checkpoint cases had been approved in Sitz and Mar-
tinez-Fuertes where the underlying offenses also had led to
criminal prosecution for DUI and smuggling. 06 The City
maintained, therefore, that because the narcotics checkpoints
could be seen as having the dual purpose and clearly approved
"special need" of highway safety in addition to uncovering
drug possession, the checkpoints should be approved.'0
The majority's response was strikingly emphatic in reject-
ing the City's arguments.' Even more important than the
majority's factual limitation of Sitz's import to where "society
[is] confronted with... immediate, vehicle-bound threat to
life and limb"09 and of Martinez-Fuerte to that of a special-
ized border control case," was the majority's willingness to
"look more closely at the nature of the public interests that
-01 Id. at 41.
'02 See id. at 41-44, 47-48.
103 See id. at 40-45.
104 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22.
100 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
10 Id. at 34, 38-39, 47.
Id. at 46.
' Id. at 46-47.
0 Id. at 43.
Io d. at 41.
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such a regime is designed principally to serve.""' Indeed, the
Court not only rejected the City's argument that "where the
government articulates and pursues a legitimate interest for a
suspicionless stop, courts should not look behind that interest
to determine whether the government's 'primary purpose' is
valid," 2 the majority identified an active role for the judi-
ciary of "examin[ing] the available evidence to determine the
primary purpose of the checkpoint program.""'
Once subjected to such scrutiny, the majority found that
the narcotics checkpoint failed because the program "unques-
tionably has the primary purpose of interdicting illegal narcot-
ics." 4 In invalidating the narcotics checkpoints, the Court
demonstrated a sensitivity to the possibility that if it allowed
a general nexus to suffice between general law enforcement
purposes and a broadly proposed "special need," then, "at this
high level of generality, there would be little check on the
ability of the authorities to construct roadblocks for almost
any conceivable law enforcement purpose."' Unlike cases
based upon probable cause where "subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analy-
sis,""6 the Court put the executive and legislative branches
on notice that it would analyze suspicionless searches to en-
sure that the government's primary purpose was not a "ruse"
offered in "bad faith" or as a "pretext" for "gathering evidence
of violations of the penal laws."" 7 The Court warned that
without meaningful review to ensure that the primary purpose
was not general crime detection camouflaged by a "special
needs" veneer, "law enforcement authorities would be able to
establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they
also included a license or sobriety check.""'
. Id. at 43.
1 Id. at 45 (quoting Brief for Petitioners).
113 Id. at 46.
"' Id. at 40.
115 Id. at 42.
11. Id. at 45 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
117 Id. at 45 (summarizing why the Court had approved inventory searches and
administrative inspections in previous cases).
118 Id. at 46.
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After Edmond, the Court's vision of the judiciary's role in
evaluating programs of suspicionless searches included a need
to look behind the government's stated justifications and ex-
amine the actual factual basis for the search. Indeed, the
image of the Edmond Court moving through the City's prof-
fered justifications and rejecting them based upon the factual
record was in many ways that of a magistrate at a suppres-
sion hearing evaluating the state's case to determine whether
factual probable cause had existed to justify a search.
By taking on this active role, the Court became what we
might call a "policy magistrate." That is, the Court undertook
an analysis that paralleled that of a magistrate looking for
traditional probable cause, only it was searching the record for
whether the government's true primary purpose justified the
checkpoint rather than for whether an informant's tip had
given sufficient suspicion of wrongdoing. The Court in
Edmond seemed to recognize more than ever before that with
intrusions that operated without the constraint of individual-
ized suspicion, the judiciary either had to actively oversee the
government's policy justifications or else effectively cede the
Fourth Amendment over to the legislative and executive
branches. Unwilling to do this, the majority placed the judicia-
ry into the pivotal role of determiner of probable cause, albeit
the "flexible probable cause" of weighing the government in-
terest against the citizen's privacy interest.119 As the Court
stepped into the role of "policy magistrate," the majority ac-
knowledged "the challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry" but
found the inquiry to be a necessary "means of sifting abusive
governmental conduct from that which is lawful."20
"' The role of "policy magistrate" actually calls back to the language of the
case that first released the reasonableness- balancing-test genie. In Camara, the
Court, while wanting to still fit within the warrant-preference view of the Fourth
Amendment but not wanting to require individualized suspicion for housing in-
spections, referred to its newly minted reasonableness balancing test as a deter-
mination of "probable cause," see Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39
(1967). See also Sundby, supra note 8, at 399-401.
20 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47. The majority also saw the need for a judicial
inquiry into the government's purpose for suspicionless searches as fitting within
a broader "constitutional jurisprudence." Id.
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B. Ferguson v. City of Charleston
Even after Edmond, a Fourth Amendment skeptic might
have suggested that although the Court had assumed the role
of "policy magistrate" for suspicionless programs, it had not
proven that it would take the role seriously. The city's mistake
in Edmond arguably was that it had been too open about its
purpose in declaring "NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT (5) MILE
AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO
STOP. 1 21 What if instead the city set up a sobriety check-
point like the Court approved of in Sitz and during the check-
point had a narcotics K-9 sniff around the car? Given that the
Court has held that a dog sniff is not a "search"1 2  and that
sobriety checkpoints have the Court's Fourth Amendment seal
of approval,'23 might not the dog sniff now be permissible
even though the checkpoint experience from the motorist's
viewpoint would be almost identical? The majority noted the
possibility of a checkpoint with a "secondary purpose of inter-
dicting narcotics" and stated that it need not decide the case,
offering only a "cf." cite to New Jersey v. T.L.O. with a paren-
thetical noting that a "search must be 'reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.'"' 24 Such an answer seemed rather tepid after
its earlier and bolder warnings in the opinion against ruses
and pretexts. Might Edmond then end up being all Fourth
Amendment sound and no fury?
1 25
The Court did not answer the question directly in
Ferguson, but its approach indicated that it viewed its emerg-
ing role of "policy magistrate" as more than a rubber stamp.
Ferguson arose out of a civil lawsuit filed by women who had
21 ld. at 35-36 (quoting Appeal to Petition for Certiorari 57).
' United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
123 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-55.
'" Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341 (1985)).
12' Professor LaFave has sarcastically suggested that if the Court should adopt
such a formalistic reading that it should appear on a David Letterman segment
of "Stupid Supreme Court Tricks." Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment as
a "Big Time" TV Fad, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 265, 274 (2001).
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received obstetrical care at the Medical University of South
Carolina (MUSC) in Charleston, South Carolina.'26 The
plaintiffs had been arrested as part of a MUSC program that
tested for the presence of cocaine in the urine of patients who
were pregnant or who had just given birth." 7 If a woman
under the program tested positive, she could be charged with
an offense ranging from simple possession to distribution
depending upon the stage of her pregnancy. 2 ' The plaintiffs
appealed an adverse finding by a jury that they had consented
to the testing."9 The Fourth Circuit in affirming, however,
did not even reach the issue of consent because it held that,
regardless of consent, the drug testing was a reasonable "spe-
cial needs" program "conducted. . . for medical purposes whol-
ly independent of an intent to aid law enforcement ef-
forts."
130
The Fourth Circuit's finding of a special need "wholly
independent" of law enforcement presented to the Court a
more difficult case than Edmond in defining the judiciary's
proper role as a "policy magistrate" under the Fourth Amend-
ment. While the Edmond Court had stated that it would ex-
amine the record for the government's primary purpose and
not simply accept any proffered purpose, the majority in
Edmond had not been forced to turn over too many evidentia-
ry stones in looking for the city's primary purpose. The check-
point signs themselves had declared the checkpoints to be for
narcotics and the City had conceded that the "checkpoint pro-
gram unquestionably ha[d] the primary purpose of interdicting
illegal narcotics." 3' In Ferguson, on the other hand, the gov-
ernment had put forward the undeniably legitimate medical
purpose of testing expecting mothers for use of narcotics as a
means of "'protect[ing] both the mother and unborn child.'"'
32
12 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70, 73.
'2 Id. at 73.
128 Id. at 72. Under the first version of the program the woman was arrested
immediately. Id. Under a later modified version, the woman was first given the
chance to undergo a treatment plan. Id.
12 Id. at 74.
12 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 477 (4th Cir. 1999).
131 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
1 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting district court's
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If the Court were to find a Fourth Amendment problem, there-
fore, it would have to scrutinize the underlying record and
develop its own judgment of whether the drug testing satisfied
its developing "special needs" jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens in writing for a majority of five Justices
made clear that the Court was not bound by the city's "benefi-
cent" purpose but was obligated under Chandler and Edmond
to engage in a "close review" of the program to see if its pur-
pose was "'ultimately indistinguishable from the general inter-
est in crime control."' 33 Stevens described Edmond's holding
as obligating the Court to "consider all the available evidence
in order to determine the relevant primary purpose,"3 4 and
the majority proceeded to consider the evidence in detail.
Particularly noticeable was the majority's extensive de-
scription of the origins of MUSC's policy beginning with how
Nurse Shirley Brown, the case manager of the hospital's ob-
stetrics department, had heard a news story about police in
another city arresting pregnant users of cocaine on a theory of
child abuse. 3 ' As the majority unfolded the sequence of
events, Brown raised the idea with the hospital's attorney
who, in turn, contacted the city's prosecutor's office.136 A
joint task force with law enforcement and hospital personnel
was formed and eventually a policy was formulated whereby a
pregnant patient was tested for cocaine use if she met certain
broad criteria.1 37 After an initial positive test, the patient
was arrested if she tested positive a second time or failed to
attend a substance abuse program (when the policy was first
implemented, a positive drug test led to an immediate ar-
rest).138
In striking down the program, the majority concluded that
findings).
' Id. at 81 (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48).
Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 70.
136 Id. at 70-71.
137 The nine criteria covered a wide range of factors such as "[i]ncomplete
prenatal care" and did not constitute suspicious behavior of drug use. Id. at 71
n.4, 77 n.10.
" Id. at 72.
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what distinguished MUSC's policy from the drug testing that
the Court had approved of in Von Raab, Skinner, and Acton
was that "the central and indispensable feature of the policy
from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce
the patients into substance abuse treatment.""9 As the
Ferguson majority pointed out, in all of the other programs
the role of law enforcement was either non-existent or mini-
mized. 4" The minimal role of law enforcement in the previ-
ous cases stood in stark contrast to the formulation and execu-
tion of MUSC's policy where "throughout the development and
application of the policy, the Charleston prosecutors and police
were extensively involved in the day-to-day administration of
the policy."' The intertwining of the police and hospital
personnel went so far as to have the police tutoring hospital
laboratory personnel on how to preserve a chain of custo-
dy.
142
The majority concluded, therefore, that even if the city's
ultimate goal was to protect maternal and fetal health, "the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence
for law enforcement purposes.""" In reaching this conclusion,
the Ferguson majority echoed the Edmond Court's concern
that if the government simply could invoke a broad non-law
enforcement goal to justify its proposed law enforcement ac-
tion, then essentially all law enforcement actions would be-
come a "special needs" search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.14 4 As the Ferguson majority observed: "Because law
enforcement involvement always serves some broader social
purpose or objective ... virtually any nonconsensual
suspicionless search could be immunized under the special
needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose."'45 Finding that
" Id. at 80; see id. at 80 n.16 (noting the Court's decisions in Von Raab,
Skinner and Acton).
'4 Id. at 80 n.16.
.. Id. at 82.
12 Id. at 82 n.19.
Id. at 83.
'" Id. at 83 nn.20-21.
... Id. at 84.
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the immediate primary purpose of MUSC's drug testing was
"for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients,
1 46
the majority found that the proffered "special need" of medical
health could not excuse the extensive entanglement of law
enforcement and prosecution.1
7
The Ferguson majority thus took the Court's role as "poli-
cy magistrate" presiding over a determination of "flexible
probable cause" in suspicionless searches to a new and greater
level of inquiry. Unlike Edmond where the "special need" of
highway safety was fairly characterized as a secondary rather
than primary purpose based upon the City of Indianapolis's
own admissions, "8 in Ferguson it was clear that a primary
purpose was the protection of fetal health in response to a
perceived epidemic of "crack babies." "9 Indeed, MUSC's test-
ing program at first had been instituted without referrals to
law enforcement, and it was only after the level of cocaine use
among expectant mothers did not seem to abate that the
threat of arrest became part of the program's effort to curtail
cocaine use by expectant mothers. 5 ' In a way, then, the
Court's objection in Ferguson was quite different from its
objection in Edmond. Its concern was not that the city's spe-
cial need was a pretext or a ruse to gain greater law enforce-
ment powers-even the majority did not seem to doubt that
the program was instituted out of a genuine concern over
crack babies-but rather that it did not believe that the spe-
cial need could support such a heavy involvement of law en-
forcement in its pursuit.' In arriving at this conclusion, the
" Id. at 85.
147 Id. at 84-86.
18 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
4 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70 n.1.
150 Id. at 70; see also id. at 99-100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
... Justice Scalia in his dissent suggested that the majority's reasoning essen-
tially was that "the purported medical rationale was merely a pretext; there was
no special need." Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While the majority may have
expressed doubts about the medical rationale, see infra note 153 and accompany-
ing text, it did not appear to view it as a pretext. Rather, as will be argued
below, the majority's objection appears to be that the city tried to achieve those




Court demonstrated a fairly far-seeking view of its duty as
magistrate to "consider all the available evidence"" 2 in mak-
ing its "flexible probable cause" determination of whether the
program justified a heavy law enforcement involvement. The
majority even questioned in a footnote the wisdom of MUSC's
judgment that threatening prosecution would curtail drug use
among expectant mothers:
It is especially difficult to argue that the program here was
designed simply to save lives. Amici claim a near consensus
in the medical community that programs of the sort at issue,
by discouraging women who use drugs from seeking prenatal
care, harm, rather than advance, the cause of prenatal
health. ",153
The Ferguson majority thus took review of the
government's "special needs" justification a step further than
either Chandler or Edmond. Chandler had found the state's
symbolic special need wanting as a justification under the
Fourth Amendment,'54 and Edmond had found that the city's
primary purpose of narcotics interdiction could not be saved by
a secondary justification of highway safety that was too far
removed from the checkpoint's primary purpose.'55  In
Ferguson, on the other hand, the Court scrutinized an admit-
tedly valid "special need" outside that of general law enforce-
ment, the need to protect maternal and fetal health, but object-
ed to the means that MUSC was using to achieve the special
15' Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86.
"' Id. at 84 n.23. At oral argument, one of the Justices when questioning the
city's attorney noted that "all the material in the amicus briefs and all the stud-
ies . . . suggest that this type of program does not help . . . the fetus. Rather
[because drug-using mothers may forego prenatal treatment if tested] . . . this
kind of program . . . probably hurts more fetuses than it helps." Oral Argument
at 45-46, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) (argued
Oct. 4, 2000). The same Justice a little later noted "I've tried to look up a little
independently, where I've come to is the conclusion-I'm not a doctor or epidemi-
ologist, but it seems to me that the studies on cocaine abuse are pretty inconclu-
sive and-as to how they affect the fetus, and even if they aren't, they're pretty
one-sided, the studies, that this kind of thing hurts the fetus because mothers
don't come in." Id. at 46.
4 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
"6 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
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need. The majority did not speak of an invalid primary purpose
as it had in Edmond but of an invalid "immediate objective"of
gathering evidence for law enforcement as a way of accomplish-
ing the primary and "ultimate goal" of trying to reduce the inci-
dence of crack babies.156 To make this determination, the ma-
jority delved into the record to trace the policy's origins, to de-
termine how the policy was implemented, and even to raise
questions over the wisdom of such a policy.
Despite the Ferguson majority's broad view of the Court's
role as "policy magistrate," however, the holding did not neces-
sarily secure a long-term role for the Court in closely reviewing
the government's means of implementing suspicionless intru-
sions. While the majority condemned the use of law enforce-
ment for the "immediate objective" of gathering evidence, a
residual tension exists between Ferguson and previous cases in
which the Court did approve of heavy law enforcement involve-
ment in the "immediate" gathering of evidence: the sobriety
checkpoint in Sitz which led to the immediate arrest of individ-
uals driving under the influence,157  an "administrative
search" in New York v. Burger which resulted in the defendant
being arrested and charged with five counts of possession of
stolen automobile parts,15 and a "special needs" search of a
probationer's home in Griffin v. Wisconsin by police and the
defendant's probation officer for a weapon. 59
The Ferguson majority worked hard to distinguish these
cases. Sitz was seen as a "checkpoint case" and not a "special
needs" case (even though in Edmond the majority had, over the
dissent's objection, relied upon the "special needs" cases to
strike down the narcotics checkpoint).' The discovery of the
stolen auto parts in Burger was optimistically characterized as
"merely incidental to the purposes of the administrative search"
even though carried out by uniformed police officers. 61 Griffin
1"0 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83.
151 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448.
' New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 695 (1987).
"' Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870 (1987).
"' Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21. The majority also suggested that the "check-
point" cases involved a less severe intrusion than one going to "the body or
home." Id.
1 Id. Justice Brennan in his Burger dissent makes a rather convincing case
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was seen as limited to the context of probationers who "have a
lesser expectation of privacy."
16 2
While each of these distinctions is defensible, the labor
necessary to distinguish these prior cases highlights the diffi-
culty and potential confusion of using a Fourth Amendment
dividing line that turns upon whether the "immediate objec-
tive" was the gathering of evidence. Anticipating the possible
confusion, Justice Kennedy in his concurrence specifically re-
jected the idea that a court should look at the immediate pur-
pose of collecting the evidence as part of the "special needs"
analysis rather than focusing on the ultimate goal to see if a
"special need" existed.'63
Moreover, the immediate objective/ultimate goal distinc-
tion, much like the primary/secondary purpose distinction used
by the majority in Edmond, arguably only encourages the gov-
ernment to engage in Fourth Amendment game playing. If the
Fourth Amendment problem in Ferguson simply is that the
evidence-gathering for criminal prosecution occurred as part of
the immediate objective, might not a program instead simply
allow the legitimate medical testing for drugs to go forward
first, and then require the hospital to turn over positive results
through mandatory child abuse reporting laws? Both the con-
curring and dissenting opinions in Ferguson thought such a
formal rearranging of the steps of the process would be valid
under the majority's analysis,' creating what Justice Kenne-
dy saw as "tolne of the ironies of the case . . . that the program
now under review, which gives the cocaine user a second and
third chance, might be replaced by some more rigorous system
[of prosecution] .,165
that the discovery of criminal evidence via an administrative search carried out
by uniformed police officers was anything but incidental. Burger, 482 U.S. at 718,
723-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Sundby, supra note 8, at 408-11.
16 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15.
16 Id. at 87-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy suggested that if
applied rigorously, the majority's focus on the "immediate objective" instead of the
"ultimate goal" would call into question all of the Court's prior "special needs"
cases because "[bly very definition, in almost every case the immediate purpose of
a search policy will be to obtain evidence." Id. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see id. at 102-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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If the concurring and dissenting opinions are correct that
the only part of the program that the city got wrong in
Ferguson was the order in which it took the steps of drug
testing and police involvement, Ferguson's holding would be
reduced to more form than substance. The ultimate message
would amount to no more than a bureaucratic admonishment
from the Court to the legislative and executive branches to
more carefully maintain the appearance of their programs: use
of evidence from suspicionless drug testing programs in crimi-
nal prosecutions is permissible, but the program must be de-
signed so that it does not appear to have a law enforcement
component upfront, even if significant penal consequences may
follow later. As Justice Scalia sarcastically noted in his dissent,
the City of Charleston's Fourth Amendment misstep, therefore,
was "that ... the police took the lesser step of initially
threatening prosecution rather than bringing it [after the pa-
tient tested positive] .,166
The majority opinion leaves open the possibility of this
weak reading of Ferguson's holding. Sensitive to what it termed
the dissent's "hyperbole" that the majority must see reporting
requirements as "clearly bad,"'67 the majority expressly
"distinguishe[d] ... circumstances in which physicians or
psychologists, in the course of ordinary medical procedures
aimed at helping the patient herself, come across information
that under rules of law or ethics is subject to reporting require-
ments," a situation "which no one has challenged here."168
This language, therefore, would not rule out a program insti-
tuted with an "immediate objective" of drug testing through
"medical procedures" upon which a reporting requirement could
later piggyback requiring that the results be turned over to the
police.
A stronger reading of Ferguson's holding, however, also is
possible. While the majority did not reject outright the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions' suggestion that merely re-order-
ing the medical testing so that it took place before police in-
'" Id. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"6 Id. at 81 n.18.
'6 Id. at 80-81.
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volvement might satisfy the Fourth Amendment, the majority
also stated that the issue was not properly before the
Court.16 And how might a stronger reading of Ferguson move
beyond mere formalism? The key lies in the Ferguson
majority's careful wording of how a different case might be
presented if the evidence of drug use was discovered "in the
course of ordinary medical procedures aimed at helping the
patient herself."7' In a similar fashion, the majority later re-
ferred to the difference between a duty to disclose "evidence of
criminal conduct that they inadvertently acquire in the course
of routine treatment""' and criminal evidence obtained, as in
Ferguson itself, "for the specific purpose of incriminating those
patients."172
Words such as "ordinary," "helping," "inadvertently" and
"routine" strongly indicate that the Court as "policy magistrate"
would be obligated to examine the record for evidence to assure
itself that any two-step testing/reporting program actually was
adopted for the "special need" of the patient's benefit and not
with an eye towards law enforcement. Such an inquiry would
necessarily push the Court even further into an active role of a
magistrate who is to "consider all the available evidence in
order to determine the relevant primary purpose. " "' The in-
quiry might even necessitate a consideration of whether such a
testing policy could be justified as a matter of medical judg-
ment, because the medical community's judgment would be
probative evidence of whether the testing program was truly
adopted to "help[] the patient" so that discovery of any incrim-
inating evidence would be an "inadvertent[]" byproduct,'74or
whether the program instead was instituted as part and parcel
of a larger law enforcement plan against drug use.
The Ferguson holding, therefore, can be read in a non-for-
' Id. at 85 n.24. The majority stated: "We decline to accept the dissent's
invitation to make a foray into dicta and address other situations not before us."
Id.
170 Id. at 80-81 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added).
172 Id. at 85.
1 Id. at 81.
..' See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
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malistic way that would allow the Court to pierce the veil of an
administrative program that might appear to have a "primary
purpose" or "immediate objective" that is not directed at gath-
ering evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, but in reality
is intertwined with a general law enforcement program.
Whether the Court is willing to envision its role of magistrate
as justifying such an active inquiry into the record to ferret out
the true "primary purpose" may very well turn upon how its
role is justified. Undoubtedly, the more deeply the Court exam-
ines the record to ensure that "special needs" cases are a "close-
ly guarded category" and works to divine the true "primary
purpose" of any suspicionless search programs, the more the
Court will be subjected to criticism for "taking yet another
social judgment . . out of democratic control, and confiding it
to the uncontrolled judgment of th[e] Court .. ." 175 The
question then becomes whether a deep-seated Fourth Amend-
ment value might justify the Court's emerging role of "policy
magistrate" in testing the government's proffered "special need"
against the evidence in the record.
IV. THE GENERAL WARRANTS DOCTRINE MEETS THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
While the colonists' concerns over general warrants and
writs of assistance have played an important role in the devel-
opment of the Fourth Amendment during much of the twenti-
eth century, the idea of a writ of assistance actually being
issued seemed as likely an event as citizens being forced to
quarter soldiers. As we have seen, the Court occasionally in-
voked the general warrant doctrine to object that a search
warrant was not drafted with sufficient particularity, but these
were judicially issued warrants that were still a far cry from
175 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Imagine, for example, if
the Court did strike down a reconstituted two-step drug testing program and in
part relied upon a finding that the medical community's judgment was that drug
testing of pregnant mothers is not medically sound (and, therefore, not part of a
"routine" exam aimed at "helping the patient"). Such an examination of the record
undoubtedly would spark pointed comments that the Court was assuming the role




the eighteenth century episodes that epitomized the evils of
general warrants. The abhorrence of general warrants was an
important underlying value but did not enter everyday Fourth
Amendment discourse because searches and seizures had for
the most part been brought within the purview of judicial over-
sight through the warrant-preference model of the Amendment.
However, as suggested earlier, the rise of the reasonable-
ness view of the Fourth Amendment coupled with the
government's growing ability to engage in suspicionless search-
es has created the possibility of government intrusions that
directly raise the concerns underlying general warrant search-
es. Indeed, the Court's emerging role as a "policy magistrate" in
Chandler, Edmond, and Ferguson can be understood as a rec-
ognition by the Court that the dangers of general warrants lurk
in suspicionless programs such as drug testing and narcotic
checkpoints. To understand how these concerns underlie the
Court's recent holdings and why they have gained a new reso-
nance in today's world of expanding surveillance techniques
and law enforcement powers, it is helpful to recall exactly why
the Framers objected to general warrants.
Few captured the Framers' objections to general warrants
as eloquently as the fiery James Otis in his argument present-
ed to a court in Boston in February 1761 in opposition to the
writs of assistance.'76 The writs were a form of a general war-
rant that authorized custom officers to search for goods that
had been imported into the colonies in violation of England's
tax laws.' The writs empowered the customs agents to
search any place that they desired for smuggled goods and to
order subjects of the Crown to assist in the search."' The
writs thus bestowed a blanket power upon the customs agents
that was in continuous effect for the life of the sovereign. 7'
Because the writs were so wide ranging in scope and were in
continual effect, the colonists grew to despise them as oppres-
176 See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
177 Davies, supra note 18, at 561.






The opportunity to challenge the writs presented itself
when King George II died in 1760. His death meant that the
writs issued during his reign would soon expire, and the writs
would only continue if a new grant of power was given. A group
of Boston merchants hired James Otis to argue against the new
issuance of the "hated" writs."s While Otis did not win the
case and new writs of assistance eventually were granted, his
argument that the writs were contrary to fundamental princi-
ples of constitutional law not only gave the court pause,' but
according to John Adams, who witnessed Otis's argument, it
"was the first scene .. .of opposition to the arbitrary claims of
Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was
born. In fifteen years, namely in 1776, he grew up to manhood,
and declared himself free."' 82 The full rhetorical power of
Otis's argument can only be appreciated if read in its entirety
(and is a speech that every student of criminal procedure
should be exposed to at least once):
May it please your honours: I was desired by one of the
court to look into the [law] books, and consider the question
now before the court, concerning Writs of Assistance. I have
accordingly considered it, and now appear not only in obedi-
ence to your order, but also in behalf of the inhabitants of
this town, who have presented another petition, and out of
regard to the liberties of the subject. And I take this opportu-
nity to declare that, whether under a fee or not, (for in such a
cause as this I despise a fee) I will to my dying day oppose,
with all the powers and faculties God has given me, all such
instruments of slavery on the one hand and villainly on the
other, as this writ of assistance is. It appears to me (may it
please your honours) the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental
principles of the constitution, that ever was found in an Eng-
" Id. (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965)).
181 Id. at 11. After Otis's argument, the court asked for further information
from England and heard further argument after the information was received be-
fore finally allowing new writs to issue. Id.
82 Id. (quoting CHARLES FRANcIS ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS
248 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856). In fact, most of what is known about
Otis's argument is due to Adam's description of what he witnessed. Id. at 10 n.4.
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lish law-book. I must therefore beg your honours patience and
attention to the whole range of an argument, that may per-
haps appear uncommon in many things, as well as points of
learning, that are more remote and unusual, that the whole
tendency of my design may the more easily be perceived, the
conclusions better ... [discerned ... 1, and the force of them
better felt.
I shall not think much of my pains in this cause, as I
engaged in it from principle. I was sollicited to engage on the
other side. I was sollicited to argue this cause as Advocate-
General, and because I would not, I have been charged with a
desertion from my office; to this charge I can give a very suffi-
cient answer, I renounced that office, and I argue this cause
from the same principle; and I argue it with the greater plea-
sure, as it is in favour of British liberty, at a time, when we
hear the greatest monarch upon earth declaring from his
throne, that he glories in the name of Briton, and that the
privileges of his people are dearer to him than the most valu-
able prerogatives of his crown. And as it is in opposition to a
kind of power, the exercise of which in former periods of Eng-
lish history, cost one King of England his head and another
his crown. I have taken more pains in this cause, than I ever
will take again: Although my engaging in this and another
popular cause has raised much resentment; but I think I can
sincerely declare, that I cheerfully submit myself to every odi-
ous name for conscience sake; and from my soul I despise all
those whose guilt, malice or folly has made my foes. Let the
consequences be what they will, I am determined to proceed.
The only principles of public conduct that are worthy a gen-
tleman, or a man are, to sacrifice estate, ease, health and
applause, and even life itself to the sacred calls of his country.
These manly sentiments in private life make good citizens, in
public life, the patriot and the hero-I do not say, when
brought to the test, I shall be invincible; I pray GOD I may
never be brought to the melancholy trial; but if ever I should,
it will then be known, how far I can reduce to practice princi-
ples I know founded in truth-In the mean time, I will pro-
ceed to the subject of the writ. In the first, may it please your
Honours, I will admit, that writs of one kind, may be legal,
that is, special writs, directed to special officers, and to search
certain houses, &c. especially set forth in the writ, may be
granted by the Court of Exchequer at home, upon oath made
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before the Lord Treasurer by the person, who asks, that he
suspects such goods to be concealed in THOSE VERY PLACES
HE DESIRES TO SEARCH. The Act 14th Car. II, which Mr.
Gridley [the lawyer arguing for the legality of the writs] men-
tions proves this. And in this light the writ appears like a
warrant from a justice of the peace to search for stolen goods.
Your Honours will find in the old book, concerning the office
of a justice of the peace, precedents of general warrants to
search suspected houses. But in more modern books you will
find only special warrants to search such and such houses
specially named, in which the complainant has before sworn
that he suspects his goods are concealed; and you will find it
adjudged that special warrants only are legal. In the same
manner I rely on it, that the writ prayed for in this petition
being general is illegal. It is a power that places the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer. I say I admit
that special writs of assistance to search special houses, may
be granted to certain persons on oath; but I deny that the
writ now prayed for can be granted, for I beg leave to make
some observations on the writ itself before I proceed to other
Acts of Parliament.
In the first place the writ is UNIVERSAL, being directed
"to all and singular justices, sheriffs, constables and all other
officers and subjects &c." so that in short it is directed to
every subject in the king's dominions; every one with this writ
may be a tyrant: IF this commission is legal, a tyrant may, in
a legal manner, also, controul, imprison or murder any one
within the realm.
In the next place, IT IS PERPETUAL; there's no return,
a man is accountable to no person for his doings, every man
may reign secure in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and
desolation around him until the trump of the arch-angel shall
excite different emotions in his soul.
In the third place, a person with this writ, IN THE DAY-
TIME, may enter all houses, shops, &c. AT WILL, and com-
mand all.
Fourthly, by this not only deputies &c. but even THEIR
MENIAL SERVANTS, ARE ALLOWED TO LORD IT OVER
US-What is this but to have the curse of Canaan with a
witness on us, to be the servant of servants, the most despica-
ble of GOD's creation?-Now one of the most essential
branches of English liberty is the freedom of one's house. A
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man's house is his castle; and [whilst] he is quiet, he is as
well guarded as a prince in his castle-This writ, if it should
be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Cus-
tom-house officers may enter our houses when they
please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their me-
nial servants may enter-may break locks, bars and every
thing in their way-and whether they break through malice
or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion
without oath is sufficient. This wanton exercise of this power
is no chimerical suggestion of a heated Brain-I will mention
some facts. Mr. Pew had one of these writs, and when Mr.
Ware succeeded him, he endorsed this writ over to Mr. Ware,
so that THESE WRITS ARE NEGOTIABLE from one officer
to another, and so your Honours have no opportunity of judg-
ing the persons to whom this vast power is delegated. An-
other instance is this.-Mr. Justice Wally had called this
same Mr. Ware before him by a constable, to answer for a
breach of the Sabbath-day acts, or that of profane swearing.
As soon as he had done, Mr. Ware asked him if he had done,
he replied, yes. Well, then, says he, "I will [show] you a little
of my power-I command you to permit me to search your
house for uncustomed goods; and went on to search the house
from the garret to the cellar, and then served the constable in
the same manner. But to [show] another absurdity in this
writ, if it should be established, I insist upon it EVERY PER-
SON, by 14th of Car. II., HAS THIS POWER as well as the
Custom-house officers; the words are, "it shall be lawful for
any person or persons authorized, &c." What a scene does this
open! Every man prompted by revenge, ill-humor or wanton-
ness to inspect the inside of his neighbour's house, may get a
writ of assistance; Others will ask it from self defence; one
arbitrary exertion will provoke another, until society be in-
volved in tumult and in blood.-Again, these writs ARE NOT
RETURNED. Writs in their nature are temporary things;
when the purposes for which they are issued are answered,
they exist no more; but these monsters in the law live forever,
no one can be called to account. Thus reason and the constitu-
tion are both against this writ. Let us see what authority
there is for it. No more than one instance can be found of it in
all our law books, and that was in the zenith of arbitrary
power, viz. In the reign of [Charles II], when star-chamber
powers were pushed to extremity by some ignorant clerk of
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the Exchequer.-But had this writ been in any book whatev-
er, it would have been illegal. ALL PRECEDENTS ARE UN-
DER THE CONTROL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW. Lord
Talbot [the Earl of Shrewsbury, an English peer of the era of
William and Mary] says, it is better to observe these than any
precedents though in the House of Lords the last resort of the
subject.-No Acts of Parliament can establish such a writ:
Though it should be made in the very words of the petition it
would be void. Vid. Viner. "AN ACT AGAINST THE CONSTI-
TUTION IS VOID." But these prove no more than what I
before observed, that special writs may be granted on oath
and probable suspicion. The Act of 7th and 8th of William III.
that the officers of the plantations shall have the same pow-
ers, &c., is confined to this sense that an officer should show
probable grounds, should take his oath on it, should do this
before a magistrate, and that such magistrate, if he think
proper should issue a special warrant to a constable to search
the places. That of 6th of Anne can prove no more. 
1 3
Otis's colorful and passionate argument highlights several
important themes concerning general warrants and writs. It is
striking that Otis begins by specifically singling out "special
writs" as valid, praising them as a comparison to the general
writ, because special writs are particular "like a warrant...
to search for stolen goods" that allow only the search of houses,
specially named, in which the complainant has sworn that he
suspects his goods are concealed." Particularly important to
Otis was that under the special writ, it is the citizen who con-
trols one's own security: "A man's house is his castle--and
[whilst] he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his
castle."8 5
And it is this image of the citizen controlling his own fate
that then becomes "annihilated" by the general writ that grants
uncontrolled discretion where "bare suspicion without oath is
sufficient."8 Without judicial review or findings before a par-
... James Otis, Against the Writs of Assistance (1761), reprinted in M.H. SMITH,
THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 548-55 (1978).
'u Id. at 552-53.




ticular search is authorized, the general writ makes it so that
"everyone with this writ may be a tyrant."8 ' And unlike spe-
cial writs which, "when the purposes for which they are issued
are answered, they exist no more,""s the general writ "live[s]
forever, no one can be called to account"8 9 because they are
not triggered by a specific suspicion which will either be proved
or disproved. In the argument's most famous line, Otis booms
that ultimately the general writ "is a power [that] places the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."' He
offers as an illustration the story of Mr. Ware who, upset with
Mr. Justice Wally for having ordered a constable to bring Ware
before the court for profane swearing, retaliates by saying, "I
will show you a little of my power. I command you to permit
me to search your house [using his general writ power]."' 9'
Ware then carried out a search "from the garret to the cel-
lar." '9 Ware followed up the search of Wally's home by next
conducting a retaliatory search upon the constable.'93 Otis us-
es the example to demonstrate how the general writ's uncon-
strained power can be prompted by "revenge, ill-humor or
wantoness." 94
V. THINKING ABOUT EDMOND AND FERGUSON
AS GENERAL WARRANT CASES
The danger of using Otis's argument to frame the dangers
of general warrants is that his fervent oratory might be easily
dismissed as painting a picture of events unlikely to happen
today. But while Otis's apocalyptic scene of "one arbitrary exer-
tion [of the general writ] will provoke another, until society be




1go Id. at 553.




195 He reaches this bloody conclusion after postulating that the statute autho-
rizing general writs in facts extends the power to "every person," so that anyone
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his vignette of Mr. Ware's abuse of the writ is not so far
fetched. In fact, the full record of the Ferguson case suggests
that MUSC's drug testing policy was designed and implement-
ed in a manner that Otis likely would have felt quite comfort-
able incorporating into his impassioned attack upon general
writs.
Nurse Shirley Brown made several appearances in the
Ferguson majority's opinion. She was the nurse who heard the
news report about another county prosecuting pregnant users
of cocaine and brought it to the attention of the hospital attor-
ney.19 She kept the files of those patients who tested positive
and was the hospital staff member who coordinated the arrests
of the patients.'97 Nurse Brown was also the one hospital
member outside the laboratory who received police training on
how to maintain a chain of custody.19 One already senses
from the majority's opinion, therefore, that Nurse Brown
played a major role in the drug testing program, but an exami-
nation of the plaintiffs' evidence at trial provides a fuller con-
text from which Nurse Brown arguably emerges as a larger-
than-life crusader.
As the case manager of obstetrics at MUSC, Nurse Brown
had been involved in overseeing a voluntary substance abuse
treatment program for pregnant patients.'99 Convinced that
the voluntary substance abuse treatment was not working,"'0
Nurse Brown heard the news report about criminal prosecu-
tions and called it to the attention of the hospital's attorney,
who then contacted the prosecutor's office. 0 1 After a joint
task force met and the law enforcement members of the task
force drew up the program's protocol, Nurse Brown became the
key figure at the hospital for implementing the policy.0 2 She
could conduct a search of another person's home.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70-71.
" Id. at 71.
199 Id. at 82 & n.19.
1 Petitioner's Brief at *2, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2000)
(No. 99-936), available at 2000 WL 728149.
200 Id. at *2 & *18 n.13 (stating that no empirical basis existed for Nurse
Brown's perception since no systematic tracking system was in place).
201 Id. at *2-3.
2'0 Id. at *3.
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kept a Rolodex in her office of patients who tested positive. 3
and was the person who would "call the police, file a complaint,
inform [the police] when a patient who had tested positive was
about to leave the hospital, and help coordinate the woman's
in-hospital arrest."
0 4
Not surprisingly, then, Nurse Brown figured prominently
in the patients' descriptions of their arrests: telling a patient
that she was to be discharged, when in fact the police were
about to enter and remove her in handcuffs to a waiting police
car; arranging for the arrest of a patient still bleeding from
childbirth, who was handcuffed while still in her hospital gown
and taken away despite her pleas to Nurse Brown of "please,
what could I do to stop this or could you help me," pleas to
which Nurse Brown merely replied, "[you will] be locked up;"
refusing a patient's request to arrange for child-care for her son
before entering the drug treatment program, saying that the
only choice was to enter the treatment program immediately or
be arrested.0 5 The plaintiffs' testimony established a picture
of patients being dragged off in handcuffs, many still bleeding
or vomiting and denied the chance to contact their families.
Moreover, these arrests were taking place in a context with
disturbing racial overtones. MUSC was the only city hospital
with a predominantly African-American population and was
the only hospital subject to the drug testing program that ulti-
mately was devised with the cooperation of the prosecutor's of-
fice and the police. Of the thirty women arrested under the
policy, twenty-nine were African-American.0 6 Evidence at tri-
al indicated that these results were not simply a result of Afri-
can-American patients using drugs at a higher rate, but from
selective testing of the types of drugs and the patients.0 7
203 Id. at *14.
204 Id. at *16.
222 id. at *7-10.
208 Id. at *12-13. Some dispute existed as to whether one of the women was to
be considered African-American, in which case the result would be twenty-eight of
thirty arrests were of African-American women. Id. at *13 n.9. Importantly, how-
ever, Nurse Brown considered the patient to be African-American. Id.
207 Id. at *12. The trial court found that the statistical analysis demonstrated
a prima facie showing of disparate impact discrimination based on the testing for
54520041
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Both Nurse Brown's own testimony and the plaintiffs'
testimony also raised the question of whether the program's
considerable discretion was being exercised even-handedly
between African-American and white patients: Nurse Brown,
for instance, called the prosecutor's office to ask for a second-
chance for a white patient who otherwise should have been
arrested under the program's protocol;0 s a witness testified
that Brown raised the option of sterilization with African-
American patients who tested positive and not with white
women in the same position;0 9 and Brown noted on white
patients' charts if their partners were black (Nurse Brown
stated at trial that she believed interracial relationships were
"against God's way").'
In short, the plaintiffs' case could be used to make an argu-
ment that the program placed Nurse Brown more in the role of
Nurse Ratched than Nurse Nightingale as she conducted the
drug testing program, and that the story of MUSC's drug test-
ing program was a classic vignette of the evils of a general
warrant that Otis so vividly described. Nor to make this case,
does one have to posit that Nurse Brown had a sinister motive
in how she conducted the program-she very well may have
been motivated purely by the desire to fight the problem of
"crack babies"-but it was her ability to implement the policy
as she saw fit that allegedly allowed the situation to become
one of unbridled discretion gone awry. Justice Brandeis's words
in his famous Olmstead dissent seem almost tailor-made to the
plaintiffs' case: "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidi-
ous encroachment by men [and women] of zeal, well-meaning,
but without understanding."
21'
Importantly, too, Ferguson's facts highlight the difficulty of
cocaine rather than for drug use generally. Id. The percentage of African-Ameri-
can pregnant patients testing positive for all drug use (68%) was considerably less
than for those testing positive only for cocaine (90%). Id.; see also Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 481 (1999).
20 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 199, at *12.
209 Id. at *13 n.10.
2,0 Id. at *13




relying upon "democratic control" to control suspicionless pro-
grams like MUSC's drug testing program."' The women sub-
jected to the program generally were poor patients seeking
treatment at the city's public hospital, a population segment
unlikely to have much of a political voice. Moreover, the pro-
gram did not originate from a legislative mandate or guberna-
torial task force established by a systematic policy-making
process, but from a determined hospital nurse who was able to
engage the attention of the local police and prosecutor's depart-
ment. Even once devised, their policy underwent no type of
legislative or state-level executive review, let alone judicial
review, but essentially was a local crusade using law enforce-
ment resources, without oversight, against what they perceived
to be a burning social need. The bottom line, in other words,
was that no matter how well-meaning Nurse Brown and the
police were, unless the judiciary was willing to review the pro-
gram as a "policy magistrate," the patients subjected to the
program had no meaningful way to raise their Fourth Amend-
ment concerns and to test the policy's implementation on a day-
to-day basis.
While Edmond's record does not raise the immediate con-
cerns that were present in Ferguson over how it was being
implemented in the field," 3 the narcotics checkpoints still res-
onate with Otis's criticisms of general warrants. One of Otis's
primary concerns was that general warrants "live forever" be-
cause "it is perpetual; there is no return" and because no suspi-
cion exists to prove or disprove." 4 The citizen, therefore, loses
his ability to keep the government from stopping him "whilst
he is quiet," because the government can substitute its own
judgment for the need to stop the "quiet" citizen rather than
having to show individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." 5
212 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court
creating "a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" in this context immune from "dem-
ocratic control").
" The drivers who filed a class action lawsuit challenging their stops claimed
that the limits in the police directives had not been followed, but they agreed to
stipulate that the checkpoints were operated according to the directives for the
purposes of the preliminary injunction decision. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
214 Otis, supra note 183, at 553-54.
215 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in holding narcotics check-
2004]
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Judge Posner, in the lower court opinion striking down the
narcotics checkpoints, noted the danger that if a general law
enforcement purpose could satisfy the Fourth Amendment, "[iun
high-crime areas of America's cities it might justify methods of
policing that are associated with totalitarian nations."s"'
Posner even posited that if the narcotics checkpoints were up-
held, the same principle could allow "the government [to] set
up a metal detector outside each person's home and require[]
the person to step through it whenever he entered or left, in
order to determine whether he was carrying a gun for which he
lacked a permit."217 As we have seen, Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion in Edmond likewise stated that no meaningful limit could
be articulated "to prevent such intrusions from becoming a
routine part of American life" if a general law enforcement pur-
pose was allowed to suffice. 18
Perhaps most importantly, the Court in Edmond clearly
took the decision of what constituted a "special need" and
placed it firmly within the judiciary's control. Unlike Ferguson,
where those subjected to the search were politically weak and
the political mechanisms for overseeing the hospital's drug test-
ing uncertain, the checkpoint in Edmond arguably would have
been subject to overview at the ballot box. After all, the ag-
grieved populace in Edmond was the entire driving citizenry. A
plausible argument could be made, therefore, that if roadblocks
were an affront to the citizenry, "the people may throw out of
office those who adopted it."
219
points invalid under the state constitution drew an analogy to the writs of assis-
tance, arguing that, "Roadblocks established for the purpose of interdicting drugs
and other contraband essentially give to the police the same powers with respect
to individuals in their automobiles as the writs of assistance granted to the Brit-
ish officials with respect to individuals in their homes." Commonwealth v. Rodri-
guez, 722 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Mass. 2000).
216 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1999).
217 Id. at 664. Judge Easterbrook in his dissent, on the other hand, believed
that automobile checkpoints under the Supreme Court's cases constituted a sepa-
rate genre of Fourth Amendment analysis and could be distinguished from the
metal detector example on that basis. Id. at 669 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
216 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
21. Edmond, 183 F.3d at 671 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook
also made the argument that roadblocks might actually promote privacy and less
intrusive government actions by making unnecessary more offensive tactics for
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By insisting in Edmond that the Fourth Amendment norm
truly was one of individualized suspicion and could only be
deviated from in situations directly implicating special needs
(like immediate highway safety concerns), the Court insulated
the individual's right to be free from government intrusion
"whilst he is quiet" from democratic override (just as a legisla-
ture, for example, could not vote to dispense with the warrant
requirement for searches of homes of suspected drug dealers).
In doing so, the Court moved suspicionless programs away
from executive and legislative discretion granted to "petty offi-
cers" and towards a Fourth Amendment that constrains discre-
tion by the need to either show suspicion of wrongdoing or by
demonstrating the existence of a compelling justification for
dispensing with individualized suspicion. Moreover, and most
importantly for dealing with the concerns that James Otis
voiced in 1761, the Edmond Court gave support to the principle
that the judiciary as "policy magistrate" would scrutinize the
government's evidence to decide whether the "special need"
actually existed to justify departure from the Fourth
Amendment's norm of traditional probable cause.220
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's impulse in Camara to bring administrative
searches like housing inspections within the Fourth
Amendment's protection was a noble one very much in accord
with the Amendment's original concerns about general war-
rants. Justice White explained that, "the basic purpose of this
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court,
is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials .... 'When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent."22' The idea that even a
detecting narcotics use that are clearly permissible under the Fourth Amendment,
such as the use of informers or searching one's trash. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting).
'20 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
22 Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
2004]
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housing inspector's entry into the home must be subjected to
judicial oversight was a concept, therefore, that comfortably fit
within the Fourth Amendment's historical concern with general
warrants.
As Camara's reasonableness balancing test spawned the
later "special needs" cases, however, the holding appeared to
have opened the door to unintended mischief. Rather than
bringing government intrusions within the Fourth Amendment
and subjecting them to rigorous judicial review, the reasonable-
ness balancing test seemed headed in the direction of giving
the government leeway to engage in suspicionless searches
based on policy judgments that the courts were hesitant to
scrutinize. The initial string of cases in which the Court ap-
proved the government's justification for checkpoints and "spe-
cial needs" or "administrative" searches-cases like Skinner,
Von Raab, Acton, Burger and Sitz-created consternation that
the Court was giving the government considerable latitude to
engage in suspicionless programs even where significant crimi-
nal consequences often followed. The Court's language in these
cases spoke comfortingly of "closely guarded" exceptions to
individualized suspicion, but the scant record supporting the
government's justification in cases like Von Raab seemed to
indicate that the Fourth Amendment's "special needs" determi-
nation was largely one of the judiciary deferring to the other
branches' judgment.
Chandler gave some hope that the Court would in fact live
up to its promises, but it was not until Edmond and Ferguson
that the Court embraced the role of "policy magistrate." In both
cases, the majority showed a willingness to require the govern-
ment to justify its "special need" as a need outside the realm of
general law enforcement, and the Court actively tested the
justification against the evidence. Like a magistrate deciding
whether to issue a search warrant, the Court asked questions
and probed the record for answers before deciding whether the
government had met its burden of proving why it should not be
required to show individualized wrongdoing.




tinue in its role as an active "policy magistrate" or whether
Edmond and Ferguson merely will become cautionary tales to
the government. Both cases hold the possibility that clever
government tinkering with labels and the ordering of events in
a suspicionless search program could satisfy a formalistic read-
ing of their holdings. When these cases arise, they are likely to
be even more challenging because they will require the Court
in its role as magistrate to go even further in its fact finding
and enter the uncomfortable terrain of labeling government
actions a "ruse" or a "pretext."222
In looking for the constitutional courage to take that step,
the Court should recall that the role of judicial oversight harks
back to the concerns over general warrants that gave rise to
the Fourth Amendment. The Framers feared discretionary
authority, the ability of government agents to decide on their
own to disturb a citizen "whilst he is quiet." Today, the
government's ability to disturb the citizen's "quiet" has grown
in technological and manpower terms far beyond what the
Framers ever imagined. Undoubtedly, the challenges of a post-
9/11 world will force society to confront difficult questions of
how to adapt law enforcement resources to meet new problems,
but in confronting those questions, we also must not forget the
22 The Court's decision in Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004), does not
necessarily demonstrate a retreat from the principles of Edmond and Ferguson.
The Lidster majority upheld an "information-seeking highway stop" at which po-
lice stopped motorists and handed out flyers asking for information about a hit-
and-run accident that had left a 70 year-old bicyclist dead. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at
888. The majority's basic distinction of Edmond was a reasonable one-that the
stop's "primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's
occupants were committing a crime, but to ask ... for their help . . . "-and on
that basis would not undercut Edmond's holding. Id. at 889. The majority
opinion, however, also contained some worrisome language that may suggest that
the Court is retreating from treating checkpoints as requiring rigorous Fourth
Amendment scrutiny. At various points, for instance, the majority stated that
"[the Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his castle" and min-
imized the intrusion involved with stopping a car. Id. Certainly, the concurring
opinion's call for remanding the case to the state court to better develop the
record as to how the police decided where to place the information stop and what
alternatives were considered was more consistent with the Court's oversight re-
sponsibilities under Edmond and Ferguson. See id. at 891 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
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historical wisdom of those who learned from living in a world of
general warrants.
